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Giles of Rome analyzed the question of the division and definition of
philosophy three times at the beginning of his philosophical career. He
devoted to this subject the prologues of two of his Aristotle commentaries,
Commentary on the Physics and Commentary on the Sophistical Refutations.1 He
then  devoted a  work exclusively to  this subject, De partibus philosophiae
essentialibus (De partibus [DPPE]).2 Because of its clear, systematic approach,
this text will be the main object of my analysis. I shall, however, discuss
material from the two prologues that demonstrates either the evolution of
Giles’s thought from the two prologues to De partibus or the changes,
corrections, or additions he introduced into the theory of science and
philosophy formulated in De partibus.
As De partibus philosophiae essentialibus is not a well known text, I will
begin with a detailed account of its contents.3 Giles’s treatise is typical of its
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1. Aegidius Romanus, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, (Venetiis,
1502); In Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentum, (Venetiis, 1496–1497). The
Prologue and I Book of Giles’s Commentary on the Physics dates to 1274; the Commen-
tary on the Sophistical Refutations dates to 1275. See S. Donati, Studi per una cronologia
delle opere di Egidio Romano, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale”
(1990/1), pp. 1–111, pp. 42–48 (esp. n. 106).
2. I provide an edition of De partibus philosophiae essentialibus in the appendix.
De partibus belongs to the early period of Giles’s carrier. However, this dating is
based on weak foundations, mostly relying on the formal and conceptual similari-
ties between De partibus philosophiae essentialibus and De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et
politicae. See the ed. and intro. by G. Bruni, “The New Scholasticism” VI (1932), pp.
1–18. For the dating of Giles’s letter (ca. 1278), see p. 4. These associations are
provoked by the old printed editions, whose editors usually joined both Giles’s
works in their publications. Indeed, we have only one sure testimony enabling us to
determine the terminus post quem of De partibus philosophiae essentialibus. It is refer-
ence made by Giles to his own In Sophisticis elenchis dated 1275. It is possible that De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus was written soon after the Commentary on the Sophis-
tical Refutations. The argument for dating De partibus philosophiae essentialibus to 1275
or 1276 rests on similarities between the two works. The last part of De partibus
philosophiae essentialibus concerning logic (187–255) is virtually identical to passages
from the Commentary on the Sophistical Refutations quoted in nn. 36 and 37.
3. De partibus philosophiae essentialibus has been analyzed in the literature only
twice. The first analysis was L. Baur’s in the commentary to his edition of
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genre and epoch. He begins his analysis of the structure of science by
formulating the most general division between kinds of beings, namely,
between those that are caused by intellect and those that cause intellect. As
Giles himself asserts, his analysis is based on Book II of Aristotle’s Physics.4
Giles notices that the Stagirite distinguishes two other causes: chance and
spontaneity. But these play no role in rest of his text (DPPE 4–10).
Giles formulates his fundamental division of the sciences on the basis
of this distinction between beings that are caused by intellect and those that
cause intellect (DPPE  11–15). His  reasoning implies that  the divisions
among sciences reproduce the distinctions among beings. According to this
principle, each science can be distinguished from the others by means of
its  proper object, which is different from the proper objects of  other
sciences. This general rule for constructing a system of distinct sciences
occurs also in Giles’s Commentary on the Physics. In the first dubium of the
Prologue, he notes that science does not draw its specification from that in
which it is but from that about which it is.5 This assumption has its ultimate
source in Aristotle and is commonly acknowledged by medieval philoso-
phers as an important principle for constructing a system of sciences.6
Gundissalinus’s De divisione philosophiae (“Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie
des Mittelalters”, Bd. 4, Hf. 2–3 [Münster, 1903], see pp. 380–85). In two pages
(382–83), Baur presents a brief summary of Giles’s work. According to Baur, De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus is worth mentioning among other medieval texts
concerning the nature and division of philosophy because, unlike earlier works, it
is based directly on Aristotle, not on late ancient (Boethius) and Arabic (Al-Farabi)
authors. Baur concludes that Giles’s treatise is relatively original, although influ-
enced by the Aristolelian commentaries of Albert and Thomas. Moreover, it is
remarkable because of its coherence and elegance. The second analysis of De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus was J. Doma¥nski’s in his recent book, La philosophie,
théorie ou manière de vivre. Les controverses de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance, Vestigia. Pensée
antique et médiévale, vol. 18 (Fribourg, Paris: Editions Universitaires de Fribourg
Suisse—Editions du Cerf: 1996) pp. 55–58. Doma¥nski presents Giles’s work as a
culmination of the theoretical vision of philosophy and as the manifestation of the
reduction of philosophy to metaphysics. I agree with this general view of De partibus
philosophiae, but I want to show the historical context of Giles’s treatise and provide
a more detailed description of its contents.
4. Aristotle, Physics, II, 1–5, 192b–197a.
5. “Scientia enim non sortitur speciem ex eo, in quo est, sed ex eo, de quo est.
Omnes enim scientiae in intellectu sunt, distinguuntur tamen et sortiuntur aliud et
aliud esse specificum, quia sunt de aliis et aliis rebus” (Aegidius Romanus, Commen-
taria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f. 2va).
6. Aristotle, On the Soul, III, 8, 431b24–26. Among medieval interpreters I
refer, above all, to Gundissalinus’s De divisione philosophiae, ed. L. Baur (BGMP,
1903), see pp. 9:20–12:9; 12:10–13:19; Kilwardby’s De ortu scientiarum, ed. A. G. Judy
(Toronto: The British Academy—The Pontilical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
1976), see III:5; X:40; the fifth question of Aquinas’s Super Boethium De Trinitate,
Thomas Aquinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, Editio Leonina t. L, (Roma–Paris,
1992), II:5, 1, 7; and the Prologue to Albert the Great’s Physica, Opera omnia, t. IV,
pars I, ed. P. Hossfeld (Aschendorff, 1987), liber I, tractatus I, De praelibandis ante
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Giles next specifies the sense in which the term “intellect” should
be taken in the distinction he has just drawn. “Intellect” signifies the hu-
man intellect as distinguished from God’s, because activities accomplished
by God’s intellect are simply the operations of nature. Nature is in fact
an instrument or an organ of God. Consequently, if the term “intellect”
included God’s intellect, then what is caused by nature would be included
among what is caused by intellect, and that would annihilate Giles’s
fundamental distinction between kinds of being (DPPE 20–40). Finally,
Giles introduces the traditional medieval thesis that things created by God
mediate between God and human beings. God’s mind is the supreme
cause of created things, and created things, in turn, cause human knowl-
edge. To this scheme Giles adds a fourth element, namely, things made
by human beings. These human products constitute the last element
in this order; in making things, human beings imitate God’s creation, in
a certain sense, and are themselves a medium between human prod-
ucts and created things (DPPE 40–53). The distinction between things
caused by nature or God and things caused by human beings, which is
the central point of Giles’s reasoning, is present also in Albert the Great’s
Physics.7
After this digression Giles returns to his main subject, the system of
sciences. First, he again draws his main distinction between beings that
cause our intellect and those that are caused by it (DPPE 54–56). He then
goes on to specify their kinds by dividing beings caused by our intellect into
two groups, the intentional and the real. Intentional beings are the results
of our thinking. Real beings are subdivided into material products (facti-
bilia) and actions (agibilia) which determine whether our life is perfect,
virtuous, and, consequently, happy or unhappy (DPPE 56–68). The final
version of Giles’s basic division of beings therefore consists of four groups:
real beings, intentional beings, actions, and products (DPPE 68–74). These
four kinds of being have their counterparts in the four main branches of
science: speculative, rational, moral, and mechanical science (DPPE
77–82).
For most medieval thinkers, this general overview of the system of
sciences is secondary to the division of sciences into the divine and the
human. This antecedent division is based on the way the sciences are
acquired. Divine science derives from divine inspiration whereas human
science is an effect of the activity of human reason. In larger works devoted
to the topic of the sciences—for example, Dominic Gundissalinus’s De
scientiam, 1; pp. 1–13. These four works together with De partibus philosophiae essen-
tialibus belong to the same Aristotelian tradition of defining the sciences and
constitute four versions of the Aristotelian system of sciences. Comparing Giles’s
text with these works will enable us to see the novelties introduced by Giles and to
understand him better in the historical context of his predecessors.
7. Albert the Great, Physica, I, I, 1, p. 1, 43–49.
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divisione philosophiae and Robert Kilwardby’s De ortu scientiarum—this funda-
mental difference is presented as a preamble to the specification of secular
sciences. (Kilwardby also includes another component in the basic division,
namely, negative science, that is, magic.8)
In this passage Giles uses the term scientia interchangeably with ars,
treating them as synonyms. Before entering the main paragraph of his
treatise concerning the essential parts of philosophy, Giles denies gram-
mar the status of science because of its arbitrariness (DPPE 75–77).9 The
problem of grammar or, more broadly, the science of language is analyzed
more carefully in Giles’s Commentary on the Sophistical Refutations. Having
divided the sciences into the real and the logical, Giles attempts to de-
termine the nature of the logical sciences. He begins with the etymology
of the Latin term logicalis. Obviously, it derives from the Greek word logos,
which has at least two meanings. It may mean reason (ratio) or speech
(sermo). In general, we may name one and the same group of sciences
either rational or about language (sermocinalis), but in its proper sense
logic is only a rational science because  the logician’s goal is to direct
reason. The direction of language is the task of grammar. Therefore lan-
guage  is grammar’s proper object, and,  thus,  the direction of it is its
proper goal.10
Giles, however, says nothing about his denial of grammar’s scientific
status. Throughout his works we see the constant tendency to separate
logic from the so-called science of language or eloquence. For Giles, logic
is something more noble and more scientific than the description of rules
for understanding words. Giles’s denying grammar scientific status can,
thus, be perceived as a second step in the process of differentiating logic
from the so-called science of language. The former formulates general
rules; the latter—because of its conventional character—offers nothing
but descriptions of the meanings of particular phrases and terms. The
8. Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, III:5; Gundissalinus, De divisione
philosophiae, pp. 3, 4–9.
9. This is quite unusual among medieval philosophers. All the classics of
scholasticism acknowledge the scientific status of grammar, placing it together
with logic and rhetoric  in the group of sciences of  language  (see  Kilwardby,
De ortu scientiarum, XLIX:468), or together with poetics and rhetoric in the sci-
ences of eloquence (see Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae, p. 3, 12–14).
However, an Aristotelian argument can be formulated against this scholastic ma-
jority, namely, that Aristotle did not treat grammar as a science in any of his
works.
10. “Logicalis scientia dicitur a logos. Et quia logos graece latine sermo vel ratio
interpretatur, dialectica proprie loquendo non dicitur a logos, quod est sermo, sed a
logos, quod est ratio. Nam si communi nomine scientiae rationales possunt dici
sermocinales, et econverso, tamen, ut patet per habita, dialectica proprie est ration-
alis, quia est directiva intellectus et rationis, grammatica vero proprie est sermoci-
nalis, quia dirigit sermonem et linguam” (Aegidius Romanus, In Aristotelis  De
sophisticis elenchis commentum, f. 2rb).
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observation that names are conventional is present also in his Commentary
on the Physics.11
From the beginning of this part of his treatise, Giles adds the third term
philosophia to the pair of scientia and ars. The motive behind introducing this
new category is probably a response to Aristotle’s statement that the main
goal of philosophy is an inquiry into truth. It seems nevertheless that Giles
uses these three terms synonymously. The thesis he wants to prove is that only
the speculative sciences constitute essential parts of philosophy (solae specula-
tive artes essentiales partes philosophiae esse dicuntur, DPPE 83–84). The justifica-
tion of his thesis is provided by the argument that the main goal of
philosophy is an inquiry into truth. This inquiry can be carried out only when
it deals with the principal and per se object of our intellect. Giles takes these
two notions—that philosophy aims at truth and that philosophy deals with in-
tellect’s principal and per se object—to be criteria for measuring the essential-
ity of sciences (DPPE 84–89). The first criterion is not satisfied by the moral
and mechanical sciences, which aim not at knowing the truth but at action or
the production of a concrete result (DPPE 89–96). The second criterion is
not satisfied by dialectic, which is the cardinal rational science, for it does not
concern real things, the principal and per se objects of intellect. Dialectic,
however, meets the first criterion because it aims at truth (DPPE 96–103).
Both criteria are satisfied only by the speculative sciences (DPPE 104–106). It
seems to me that, for Giles, a science’s being an essential part of philosophy
results merely from meeting these two criteria; they constitute the essence of
philosophy, and when something satisfies the essence of philosophy, it can be
named as one of its essential parts. This technical sense of the term “essen-
tial” does not rule out its broader meaning, that is, “principal,” “main,” or
“basic.” Moreover, it explains why the speculative sciences and not other parts
of philosophy are essential in the broader sense.
It is quite probable that the direct source of the formula essentialis pars
philosophiae is to be found in Michael Scott’s translation of the Metaphysics
and of Averroes’s commentary on it. According to Michael Scott’s transla-
tion, Aristotle’s text is:
modi igitur philosophiae essentiales sunt tres: mathematicus, naturalis
et divinus;12
and Averroes’s is:
manifestum est igitur ex hoc sermone, quod modi philosophiae specu-
lativae sunt tres: scilicet scientia rerum mechanicarum et naturalium et
11. “Nomina sunt ad placitum” (Aegidius Romanus, Commentaria in octo libros
Physicorum Aristotelis, f. 3ra). This statement has an interesting context. Giles em-
ploys it to persuade that the universally accepted usage of the name does not
determine the nature or essence of the named object because we can arbitrarily
produce a new definition of a name.
12. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, Apud Iunctas, f. 145L.
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divinarum, scilicet substantiarum, in quorum definitione accipitur
Deus.13
This problem plays no important role in Averroes’s text and receives no
further analysis. As Doma ¥nski has pointed out, Albert the Great also used
the expression essentialis pars philosophiae in his Physics.14
The formula essentialis pars philosophiae is present in both of Giles’s
Aristotelian commentaries, as are other ideas from the central part of De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus. In the Commentary on the Sophistical Refuta-
tions he states that logic cannot be an essential part of philosophy.15 This
thesis occurs in a dubium entitled Whether logic is a necessary and essential part
of philosophy. Here, Giles maintains that science properly should concern
things; therefore, the classic tripartite division of the sciences depends on
distinctions among things. Subsequently, Giles quotes the famous fragment
from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and alludes to the Boethian conception of
three modes of abstraction. He then refers to his own Commentary on the
Physics remarking that he had discussed this theory at greater length
there.16
Before turning to the Commentary on the Physics, I would like to point
out one more thesis that Giles advances in his Commentary on the Sophistic
Refutations, namely, that dialectic does not fulfill the notion of science.17
The justification of this statement is formulated in the third dubium of the
Prologue entitled Whether dialectic can be properly called a science. In this
passage, Giles asserts that dialectic is a mode of knowing rather than a
science because science is in the intellect and concerns things that can
13. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, VI, comm. 2, f. 146GH.
14. J. Doma¥nski, La philosophie, théorie ou manière de vivre, n. 19 to chap. II,
refering to Albert the Great, Physica, I, 2, 1, p. 16, 3–4; the same expression is also
used in the Prologue, I, I, 1, p. 1, 43–45. But in his De praedicabilibus Albert points
out that Al-Farabi and Avicenna used a similar formula (realis pars philosophiae) in
their criticism of ascribing logic the status of science (Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia,
ed. A. Borgnet, [Parisiis, 1890], vol. 1). Albert’s own solution is opposite, he says
that logic, insofar as it tends to the truth, can be generally named science (see p.
4a).
15. See Aegidius Romanus, In Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentrum, f. 2rb.
Giles restricts himself only to the assertion that logic is not scientia realis.
16. “Cum scientia sit proprie de rebus, partes essentiales philosophiae accipi-
untur secundum divisionem rerum. Et quia res tripliciter possunt accipi, vel ut
coniunctae motui et materiae secundum esse et definitonem, ut naturalis; vel sunt
coniunctae secundum esse, et non secundum definitionem, ut mathematica, vel
nec sunt coniunctae secundum definitionem nec secundum esse, ut scientia divina,
ideo dicitur VI Methaphysicae, quod tres sunt modi essentiales philosophiae:
physicus, mathematicus et divinus. Hoc autem in declarationibus, quas super primo
Physicorum edidimus, plenius tractavimus” (See Aegidius Romanus, In Aristotelis De
sophisticis elenchis commentum, f. 3ra).
17. “Igitur secundum hunc modum dialectica sicut deficit a ratione scientiae,
sic deficit, quod non est essentialis pars philosophiae” (See Aegidius Romanus, In
Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentum, f. 3ra).
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properly be intellect’s objects. But these objects are things external to
intellect. Thus, since dialectic treats intentions that exist in the intellect, it
cannot be a science in the strict sense of the word.18 This reasoning can
easily be transformed into the second criterion for the essentiality of science
as formulated in De partibus philosophiae essentialibus.
In his Commentary on the Physics, Giles gives less attention to this piece
of his theory of science, focusing instead on other observations concerning
the nature of the branches of philosophy or science. He starts his inquiry
into the nature of physics and its place in the system of sciences with the
distinction between practical and speculative sciences. The former have as
their goal the good or some product. By contrast, the latter, including
physics, aim at truth. So all the sciences that aim primarily at the good
pertain only secondarily to truth; and sciences that have as their main goal
knowing the truth can attain the good only accidentally. The final conclu-
sion of Giles’s argumentation is this: neither the sciences having to do with
acting (operativae) nor the rational sciences can be essential parts of philoso-
phy.19 We can see, then, that Giles’s central idea remains the same through-
out his works. However, its clearest and most elegent expression is in De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus.
Having established his thesis, Giles proceedes to the subdivisions of the
speculative sciences. He reproduces Aristotle’s famous division formulated
in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, which distinguishes three speculative
sciences: namely, divine science or theology (that is, metaphysics in the
post-ancient terminology), mathematics, and physics.20 The distinction de-
18. “Ratio autem, quia dialectica est magis modus sciendi quam scientia, ex
hoc sumi potest, quia scientia est in intellectu. Et de illis proprie et principaliter est
scientia, quae proprie et principaliter possunt esse obiectum intellectus. Cum ergo
intellectus per se et primo intelligit ipsas res et alia a se et intelligendo ea intelligit
seipsum, ut potest haberi ex III De anima commento 15, nihil, quod est in intellectu,
secundum quod huiusmodi poterit principale esse obiectum intellectus. Dialectica
ergo, quae est de conceptibus et intentionibus, ut sunt quid rationis, proprie
scientia esse non poterit, erit tamen modus sciendi” (See Aegidius Romanus, In
Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentum, f. 2vb).
19. “Naturalis scientia est aliqua scientiarum speculativarum, ut dicitur VI
Metaphysicae. Speculativa autem scientia differt a practica quantum ad finem, quia
finis speculativae est veritas, practicae autem opus, ut declarari habet II Metaphysicae,
vel ut quaedam translatio habet, practicae finis est bonum. Et in idem redit, quia
omnis actio vel omnis electio et proheresis bonum aliquod considerare videtur, ut
habet declarari I Ethicae . . . Ex hac autem differentia, quam esse conspicimus inter
scientiam speculativam et practicam, patere potest, quod licet speculativa ad phi-
losophiam essentialiter possit pertinere, practica autem quasi per accidens ad
philosophiam se habebit. Nam cum philosophia, et universaliter omnis scientia, in
intellectu consistat, ad scientiam et ad philosophiam illa essentialiter pertinere
poterunt, in quae fertur intellectus secundum se. Obiectum autem potentiae intel-
lectivae est verum et per se intellectus fertur in veritatem” (Aegidius Romanus,
Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f. 2ra).
20. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI, 1, 1026a18–19.
PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO GILES OF ROME 201
pends on the level of abstraction proper to each science (DPPE 104–113).
Giles offers two parallel orders of abstraction, which can be used as a basis
of the division of the speculative sciences. The first one is the order of
abstraction characteristic of the sciences themselves. Every science abstracts
from different kinds of materiality: physics abstracts from this or that sensi-
ble matter which is a part of this or that thing; mathematics abstracts from
sensible matter completely, although it concerns intelligible matter; meta-
physics abstracts from every kind of matter (DPPE 113–126). The second
order is an order of abstraction typical for the objects of each of the
sciences. Physics concerns things that are abstracted from matter neither as
beings (secundum esse) nor  in their definitions (secundum definitionem).21
Mathematics deals with things abstracted in their definitions only, meta-
physics with things abstracted in both ways (DPPE 126–130). The tripartite
division of the speculative sciences and the modes of abstraction appealed
to as its ground are typical indices of Aristotelian systems of sciences.22
21. This mysterious formula finds its best intepretation in Aquinas’s Super
Boethium De Trinitate (see II, 5, 1, corp.). Instead of the thing abstracted as regards
being (secundum esse), Aquinas puts simply immaterial thing. Instead of abstraction
as regards definition (secundum definitionem) Thomas speaks about abstraction in the
intellect. According to him, the thing abstracted in intellect means that in the
definition of such a thing formulated in our intellect there is no matter, although
it is possible that this thing has in fact matter as its part. It is exactly the case of the
objects of mathematics, which can exist only as material, though they are intellected
as pure structures devoid of any matter. Moreover, Aquinas presents a justification
for the sufficiency of a number of the speculative sciences. He asserts, namely, that
if we combined these two kinds of abstraction, in being and in intellect, we would
obtain four possible species of things: abstracted in being and definition, which are
treated by metaphysics; not abstracted in being nor in definition, that is the objects
of physics; abstracted in definition but not abstracted in being, which concerns
mathematics; and not abstracted in definition but abstracted in being. The last
possibility, however, has no designates, since nothing can be in fact immaterial and
known as material.
22. Besides Aquinas (see n. 21), this concept is proper also to Gundissalinus
(De divisione   philosophiae, pp.   14:19–15:15),   Kilwardby   (De ortu scientiarum,
XXV:203), and Albert the Great, (Physica, I, I, 1, pp. 1, 45–60). Its ultimate source
is, of course, Boethius’s De Trinitate, which was repeated by all the above mentioned
authors; see Boethius, De Trinitate, in: Thomas de Aquino, Super Boethium De Trini-
tate, p. 69, 68–79. The tripartite division of the speculative science and its principle
(the theory of three modes of abstractions) is also mentioned in Giles’s Commentary
on the Physics: “Si rationales et operativae essentiales philosophiae partes esse non
possunt, solae considerationes physicae, mathematicae et divinae ad philosophiam
pertinere videntur. Ex hoc autem innotescit veritas illa, quae scribitur VI Metaphysi-
cae, quod tres sunt modi essentiales philosophiae: videlicet naturalis, mathematicus
et divinus. Horum autem sufficientia haberi potest secundum Commentatorem VI
Metaphysicae. Entia enim vel circumcernunt materiam et motum secundum esse et
secundum definitionem, vel sunt abstracta secundum definitionem et non secun-
dum esse, vel utroque modo abstracta esse dicuntur. In primo gradu sunt naturalia,
in secundo mathematica, in tertio divina” (Aegidius Romanus, Commentaria in octo
libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f. 2ra).
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Giles ends his considerations of the nature of the speculative sciences
by presenting the subdivisions of mathematics. He maintains that metaphys-
ics and physics are not subject to further distinctions (DPPE 130–131). The
integrity of metaphysics was commonly accepted by scholastic philosophers.
The  internal unity of physics, on the contrary, is an original concept.
Unfortunately, Giles does not offer any proof of it.
Moreover, in his Commentary on the Physics,23 Giles proposes a fully
developed subdivision of  physics.  He  asserts  that the  proper object of
physics is moving body, which is subject to further divisions. Moving body as
such (simpliciter) is treated in physics, and its specific kinds are described in
several of Aristotle’s works. The full scheme of these subdivisions or
branches of natural science and the corresponding titles of the Stagirite’s
works can be presented diagrammatically:
23. See, Aegidius Romanus, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f. 2rb.
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Analogous constructions can be found in Gundissalinus’s De divisione
philosophiae,24 Kilwardby’s De ortu scientiarum,25 and Albert’s Physica.26 They
all propose fully developed and complicated subdivisions of physics based
on the variety of moving bodies and in full agreement with the structure of
Aristotle’s work. The most striking advantage of Giles’s subdivision of phys-
ics is the perfect logical form of his Porphyrian tree, a feature missing from
earlier accounts. Although all the philosophers mentioned above begin
from physics as dealing with moving body as such, they differ in virtue of
their subdivisions, especially in the case of the sciences dealing with animate
things.
What remains a mystery is Giles’s motive for changing his mind in De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus and giving a negative answer to the question
whether physics is subject to subdivision. He discusses a similar question in
the last dubium of the Prologue of his Commentary on the Physics, where he
states that physics and natural science (understood as a sum of the special
branches of physics) do not have the same object because physics analyzes
moving body universally whereas natural science analyzes moving body in
each of the particular aspects in which it can be considered.27 A difference
in the objects of sciences is a sufficient foundation for distinguishing the
sciences.
There is one more element carefully analyzed by Giles in his Commen-
tary on the Physics that is only marked in De partibus philosophiae essentialibus,
namely, the relations between physics and metaphysics. These relations are
the subjects of the two first dubia, Whether physics precedes metaphysics and
Whether physics is subordinate to metaphysics. Giles give a negative answer to the
first question. His argument is based on the ontological priority of the
object of metaphysics (abstracta) over the object of physics (sensibilia).28 At
the same time, physics is independent from metaphysics because the prin-
ciples of physics derive from sensible things that are the direct source of the
24. See, Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae, pp. 20:11–23:15.
25. See, Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, X:41–58.
26. See, Albert the Great, Physica, I, I, 4, pp. 6:39–7:64.
27. “Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis, utrum sit idem subiectum in tota philoso-
phia naturali et in hoc libro. Et videtur, quod sic, quia in hoc libro subiectum est
corpus mobile simpliciter non contractum ad hoc vel ad illud. Sed corpus mobile
est subiectum simpliciter in tota philosophia naturali, ergo etc.
Ad hoc autem dici oportet, quod aequivoactur in eo, quod simpliciter. In tota
enim philosophia naturali subiectum est corpus mobile sumptum simpliciter, id est,
sumptum secundum omnem acceptionem, ad naturalem enim pertinet et consid-
erare de corpore mobili secundum omnem modum et secundum acceptionem
motus. In hoc autem libro subiectum est corpus mobile sumptum simpliciter, id est
universaliter. Consideratio autem particularis de corpore mobili non pertinet ad
hunc librum, pertinet tamen ad philosophiam naturalem” (Aegidius Romanus,
Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f. 3vb).
28. See Aegidius Romanus, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f.
2va.
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principles’ evidentness. The principles of physics therefore cannot be re-
duced to any principles of metaphysics. Giles gives two examples of the
subordination of one science to another. The first is the case of perspective
and geometry. The object of perspective is a visible line, but perspective
makes use  of some principles  that it cannot  prove but  are proved by
geometry, which deals with the line as such. Geometry thus subordinates
perspective. Giles employs the same structure of reasoning in De partibus
philosophiae essentialibus in the presentation of the subdivision of mathemat-
ics. Giles’s second example is that of medicine and physics. The proper
object of medicine is the human body, which is, however, particular. Since
principles of knowledge must be expressed in general statements, medicine
has to accept some assertions from a higher science, that is, from physics.
This kind of definition of the object of medicine can serve as a reason
for taking medicine to be a part of physics since human body is a particular
kind of moving body. But medicine is not mentioned in Giles’s division of
physics presented above. Perhaps we can explain this incongruity by adapt-
ing Kilwardby’s thesis that medicine in its essence is one of the mechanical
sciences.29
Giles ends this dubium by asserting that physics is not subordinate in
either of these ways by metaphysics but itself subordinates sciences dealing
with the various aspects of moving bodies.30
Giles’s views on the mathematical disciplines are governed by the divi-
sion of its object, that is, quantity, into discrete and continuous. A discrete
quantity is an object of arithmetic, while continuous quantity is an object of
geometry. This is followed by the applied mathematical sciences. For in-
stance, perspective is a science of continuous quantity applied to sight.
Among the applied branches of mathematics are music, astronomy, and
stereometry (the science of the measure of buildings) (DPPE 131–150).
Giles next presents the division of mechanics. First, he ennumerates
several kinds of mechanical arts (craft, carpentry, spinning, weaving); he
then formulates a criterion by which he establishes a hierarchy of mechani-
cal sciences. Giles states that some mechanical sciences deal with form and
others deal with matter. Those mechanical sciences that deal with form
dominate and are served by those that deal with matter. For example,
shipcraft subordinates carpentry, and spinning serves weaving (DPPE
151–164).
It is worth noting that Giles’s division of mechanics is distant from
Hugh of St. Victor’s classic division. Hugh asserted that are seven mechani-
cal sciences on analogy with the seven liberal arts: weaving, armour-making,
agriculture, hunting, navigation, medicine, and theatre.31 Kilwardby ob-
29. Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, X:57.
30. Aegidius Romanus, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, f.
2vb–3ra.
31. Hugo de Sancto Victore, Didascalicon, II:21.
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jected to Hugh’s position, doubting whether is was necessary to maintain
that the mechanical sciences were exactly seven, and whether Hugh’s list
was adequate.32 Giles does not even mention Hugh’s scheme; he ennumer-
ates among the mechanical sciences some that Hugh does not touch on,
and he omits others named by Hugh. One may conclude that Kilwardby’s
and Giles’s reflection on the mechanical sciences is marked by the tendency
to liberate them from the twelfth-century theories. Giles emphasizes the
internal range the of mechanical sciences, which is the result of his applying
to them a measure deriving from Aristotle’s distinction between form and
matter.
In his discussion of the moral sciences Giles offers the typical tripartite
division into ethics, economics, and politics. These three are distinguished
from each other by differences in the communities or unions that they
rule and whose good they determine. Ethics prescribes rule for the union
and subjection of the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul to its
rational part. Economics establishes rules for the family, understood here
in the broad Aristotelian sense, governed by a paterfamilias. Politics con-
cerns the country reigned by a king (DPPE 165–186). What is striking
here is that the description of ethics as a set of rules determining the
rational soul’s governance of the soul’s other parts seems artificial and a
rather mechanical extrapolation of the structure proper to politics. Politics
thus becomes an archetype of moral science.
Giles ends his analysis of the system of sciences with a description of
the rational sciences. He commences by repeating his remark that the
proper objects of rational sciences are not actions of reason but their effects
or intentions. In his Commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, Giles adds two
arguments in support of this assertion. In the first, Giles asserts that dialectic
is a science of reason, and reason refers to its act and to the object of its act.
But reason refers to its object per se and to its act only secondarily (according
to Aristotle’s statement that self-knowledge depends on the knowledge of
an extramental object). So intentions, which are the objects of intellect, are
the objects of dialectic as well. In the second argument, he observes that
these intentions, not the operations of intellect, are indeed the subject-mat-
ter of Aristotle’s investigations in all his logical works.33 Giles’s statement
that intentions, not actions of intellect, are rational science’s proper object
is obviously an attack on Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle’s logical
works. In both his commentaries, Thomas asserts that actions of reason are
the proper object of logic.34
32. Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, XL:372–78.
33. Aegidius Romanus, In Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentum, f. 2va.
34. “[Logica] non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem,
quod est omnibus artibus commune, sed ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum
rationis, sicut circa propriam materiam” (Thomas de Aquino, Expositio libri Posteri-
orum, Opera omnia, t. I*, 2 [Roma-Paris, 1989], p. 3, 25–28; see also, Expositio libri
Perihermeneias, Opera omnia, t. I*, 1 [Roma-Paris, 1989], p. 5, 1–17).
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There  are  four relevant  kinds of intentions, namely, example, en-
thymeme, induction, and syllogism. The first two are employed by rhetoric
and the last two by dialectic.  Since induction  and syllogism  are more
powerful means of arguing than example and ethymeme, dialectic subordi-
nates rhetoric (DPPE 187–213).35 Almost identical reasoning can be found
in Giles’s Commentary on the Sophistical Refutations.36
Putting aside the question of the subdivisions of rhetoric, Giles concen-
trates on the subdivisions of dialectic. Each part of dialectic deals with
different operations of reason. There are three operations: defining, ascrib-
ing a definition to an object (that is, forming a proposition), and compos-
ing a syllogistic argument from propositions. These three are treated by
Aristotle in three treatises: definition in De Interpretatione, proposition in
Categories, and syllogism in the set of logical writings known in the Middle
Ages as the logica nova. Giles excludes Porphyry’s Isagoge and the Liber sex
principiorum from the essential parts of logic and counts them rather as
introductory for logic (DPPE 214–238).
Giles continues to apply this scheme to describe the branches of logic
dealing with the various kinds of syllogisms. While he treats syllogism gen-
erally in Prior Analytics, Giles addresses the subject in more detail in other
works. According to Giles, there are different kinds if syllogisms depending
on the necessity of the syllogism’s matter and on the syllogism’s topical
properties. The first case is described in Posterior Analytics. The second is
twofold: topical properties are probable and coherent or they are not. The
former possibility is treated in Topics, the latter in Sophistical Refutations
(DPPE 239–255). This part of Giles’s subdivision of dialectic is a simple
repetition, in abbreviated form, of his theory of the branches of logic
presented earlier in his Commentary on the Sophistical Refutations.37
This division of logic is deeply rooted in Albert’s and Aquinas’s earlier
35. That motif derives directly from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as Giles himself ac-
knowledges. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1, 1354a.
36. “Dicere possumus, quod inter ea, quae ex parte rationis se tenent,
quaedam sunt violentiora et magis efficatia, quaedam vero sunt infirmiora et magis
debilia. Ut syllogismus est magis effcatior quam enthymema. Et inductio quam
exemplum. Est ergo rationalis dialectica et rhetorica, aliter tamen et aliter, quia
dialectica principaliter considerat, quae sunt efficatiora ad concludendum, ut sunt
syllogismus et inductio. Rhetorica vero considerat debiliora, ut enthymema et
exemplum. Est enim inductio efficatior exemplo, sicut syllogismus efficatior en-
thymemate. Rhetorica ergo non est dialectica, est tamen aliquo modo assecutiva [in
cod. executiva] dialecticae, quia ea, de quibus considerat rhetorica, reducuntur et
ordinantur ad ea, quae considerantur in logica sicut infirma ad fortiora” (Aegidius
Romanus, In Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentum, f. 3va).
37. “Sunt ergo isti tres actus intellectus: primus est simpliciter cognoscere,
secundus componere et dividere, tertius est discurrere et inferre. Secundum hos
tres actus tria format. Nam intelligendo simplicia format simplicem conceptum et
definitionem; intelligendo composita format enuntiationem; discurrendo format
syllogismum. Ideo secundum hos tres actus rationis consuevit communiter dividi
logica in tres partes: videlicet quantum ad intellectum simplicem in Praedicamenta;
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commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon. In his De praedicabilibus, Albert begins
with the assertion that logic deals with everything by means of which we can
obtain knowledge of something that was previously unknown. The most
excellent instrument for acquiring knowledge is the syllogism; therefore, it is
the proper object of logic.38 Albert next divides logic into the science of
definition and the science of judgment.39 He then continues his reflection
on the parts of logic saying that the science of invention, that is, the invention
of definition, is described in Aristotle’s Topics, while the science of judgment
is addressed in Prior and Posterior Analytics (depending on whether the cor-
rectness of the syllogism is formal or material). Moreover, Sophistical Refuta-
tions should prevent us from making mistakes in reasoning and Universalia
and Categories explain the structure of the parts of syllogism.40
Giles’s division of logic is even nearer to Aquinas’s. Aquinas begins with
the basic tripartite division of logic into sciences dealing with different
actions of reason, namely, definition, the forming of propositions, and
reasoning. There is, however, a difference between Aquinas and Giles with
regard to the linking of these actions with Aristotle’s works. Aquinas says
that definition is treated in Categories and judgment in De Interpretatione.41
According to Aquinas, the science of reasoning is divided into three
parts. The science of resolution deals with the syllogism, the certainty of
which depends on its form or on its matter. The former possibility is treated
in Prior Analytics, the latter in Posterior Analytics. Next is the science of
invention, which pertains to statements lacking certainty. These statements
are subdivided into opinions (which are expressed in probable syllogisms
in Perihermeneias quantum ad intellectum compsitum; et in libros artis novae quan-
tum ad illum actum intelligendi, qui est discurrere et inferre. Hoc autem etsi bene
dictum est, videtur tamen, si per se loqui volumus, quod magis accipienda sit divisio
dialecticae secundum conceptus et intentiones, quae formantur ex his actibus, ut
dicamus, quod in libro Praedicamentorum determinatur de simplicibus conceptibus,
ut de quidditatibus et conceptibus decem generum. In libro autem Perihermeneias
determinatur de enuntiatione, quae formatur ex intellectu componente et divi-
dente: componente quantum ad enuntiationem affirmativam, dividentem quantum
ad negativam. In libris autem artis novae determinatur de syllogismo, qui formatur
ex intellectu discurrente et inferrente. Libri ergo artis novae dividi possunt secun-
dum divisionem syllogisticam. Syllogismus enim dupliciter potest accipi, simpliciter
et contractus. Si sumatur simpliciter, sic determinatur de eo in libro Priorum. Si
autem contrahatur, hoc erit dupliciter, quia vel contrahitur ex necessitate materiae,
et sic est liber Posteriorum, vel ex habitudine locali. Et hoc dupliciter, quia huiusmodi
habitudo vel est congrua, ubi poterit salvari forma syllogistica, et sic est liber
Topicorum; vel erit forma incongrua, ubi forma syllogistica salvari non potest, et sic
est liber Elenchorum” (Aegidius Romanus, In Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commen-
tum, f. 2rb).
38. Albert the Great, De praedicabilibus, I, 4, p. 8a–b.
39. Albert the Great, De praedicabilibus, I, 5, p. 8b.
40. Albert the Great, De praedicabilibus, I, 7, p. 15a-b.
41. Thomas de Aquino, Expositio libri Perihermeneias, p. 5, 15–30; Expositio libri
Posteriorum, p. 4, 29–46.
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and are the subject of Topics), suspicions (treated in Rhetoric), and estima-
tions (described in Poetics). The third part of the science of reasoning has
as its proper object sophistical syllogisms of the sort analyzed by Aristotle in
his Sophistical Refutations.42
This part of Aquinas’s subdivision of logic might seem further from
Giles’s account than it actually is. If one were to remove rhetoric and poetics
from Aquinas’s science of invention, one would obtain exactly Giles’s system
of the sciences of the syllogism. Giles’s displacement of rhetoric and poetics
is entirely reasonable and makes the structure of the division of rational
sciences tighter and more elegant.
The whole of Giles’s system of the sciences, then, can be presented
diagramatically:
As we can now see, the main points of Giles’s reflections on science and
philosophy are almost identical in his three works. Material gathered in his
commentaries is used in the systematic presentation in De partibus philoso-
phiae essentialibus. Therefore, we might view his theory as nothing other than
a reformulation of the Aristotelian conception of science and philosophy.
But a more interesting perspective on Giles’s text and a deeper insight into
the very essence of his position become available when Giles’s account is
placed in the broader context of the great discussions of the epoch.
Having presented the contents of De partibus philosophiae essentialibus, I
42. Thomas de Aquino, Expositio libri Posteriorum, pp. 5, 50; 7, 127.
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now turn  to Giles’s thesis that only speculative sciences  constitute  the
essential parts of philosophy. In order to understand the proper meaning
of this thesis, it is useful to contextualize it within two partly independent
medieval discussions. The first concerns the proper senses of the term
scientia, ars, and philosophia; the second deals with the autonomy of philoso-
phy and its place in the hierarchy of human knowledge.
As countless examples of medieval literature demonstrate, medieval
thinkers treated scientia, ars, and philosophia as coextensive and even synony-
mous terms. As we have seen, Giles proceeds in this way, too. In De partibus
philosophiae essentialibus he begins his analysis with the term scientia, then
speaks about scientia sive ars, and, finally, adds philosophia—in each case
having one and the same thing in mind.
So many terms describing the same thing probably seemed superfluous
to medieval minds. As each of these three terms has associations not charac-
teristic of the others, using the terms interchangeably would seem to risk
confusion. Moreover, because these terms cover such a large and varied
domain of objects, the introduction of some semantic specifications was
necessary. Thus, medieval thinkers came to reflect on the proper meaning
and peculiarities of scientia, ars, and philosophia. The most obvious result of
this reflection was a new definition of art distinguishing it from science. We
can find a typical argument in favor of the distinction in Kilwardby’s De ortu
scientiarum. He says there that the terms scientia and ars are not coextensive or
synonymous because “science” involves speculation and “art” has as its effect
a material thing. Hence, the term ars is to be applied only to mechanical
science. As such, we should not use it to name metaphysics or any speculative
science.43 We find similar reasoning in Thomas Aquinas’s Super Boethium De
Trinitate.44 According to Thomas, the term ars connotes necessarily, besides
cognition, a product of work. Therefore, the possibility of the application of
the term ars to philosophy is excluded. A conclusion following tacitly from
Kilwardby’s and Aquinas’s lines of thought is that it is no longer possible to
define philosophy as a liberal science, a conclusion wholly undermining the
early medieval vision of science and philosophy. Although Giles does not
oppose ars and scientia, I have included the distinction in my analysis because
it shows the importance and the dimensions of the problem.
Another testimony to the reconstruction of the terminology pertaining
to the system of sciences concerns the term scientia. Reflecting on the
differences between practical and speculative science, Kilwardby concludes
that the term scientia can be applied only to speculative sciences because
only in them do proofs and arguments lead to general knowledge. So the
term scientia must have only an analogical sense when applied to ethics and
to other practical sciences.45
43. Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, XLV:416.
44. Thomas de Aquino, Super Boethium De Trinitate, II, 5, 1, ad 3.
45. Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, XLI:380–81.
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In this context, texts from Aquinas’s Super Boethium De Trinitate are even
more interesting. Thomas argues that logic does not belong to the specula-
tive sciences because, unlike logic, they are autothelic. Thomas expresses
his views in a phrase that parallels Giles’s formula; he says that logic is not
contained in philosophy as a principal part.46
Finally, Kilwardby and Aquinas as well as Giles tend to differentiate
the whole construction of the system of sciences by distinguishing a
science par excellence or the essential part of science or philosophy, namely,
metaphysics. In a certain sense this procedure is analogous to Aristotle’s
separating first philosophy from philosophy in general. They argue that
the Aristotelian ideal of science can be satisfied only by philosophy and,
more specifically, by metaphysics. This conception in some way transposes
the juxtaposition of metaphysics and mechanics popular among medieval
thinkers. For instance, in his Metaphysicales quaestiones, Giles presents
metaphysics as liberal and theoretical in opposition to the mechanical
sciences, which are identified as ancillary and practical, or even utilitar-
ian.47 Giles’s Commentaries on the Physics and Sophistical Refutations together
with De partibus philosophiae essentialibus are succesive stages in the same
process of differentiating the sciences. In his Quaestiones Giles sketches
the general opposition, and in De partibus philosophiae essentialibus he builds
groups of sciences around these contrasted branches of knowledge, that
is, authentic philosophy around metaphysics and practical sciences around
mechanics.
A second discussion affecting Giles’s views on the nature of philosophy
has to do with the problem of its place and value in human life. The period
before Giles wrote De partibus philosophiae essentialibus was marked by the
influence of another Aristotelian idea concerning the nature of philosophy.
In addition to being the summit of human cognition, philosophy consti-
tuted an ultimate purpose of humanity and offered to human beings the
sole felicity available to them.48 The best known formulation of this idea is
46. Thomas de Aquino, Super Boethium De Trintate, II, 5, 1, ad 2: “logica non con-
tinetur sub speculativa philosophia quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quidam reductum
ad philosophiam speculativam”. See also n. 14 concerning Albert the Great.
47. Aegidius Romanus, Metaphysicales quaestiones aureae (Venetiis, 1552), Apud
Octavianum Scotum, I, Qu. 21 Utrum artes mechanicae sint meliores speculativis, f. 10v
and Qu. 25 Utrum metaphysica sit libera vel serva, f. 12r–12v.
48. Giles is aware of the problem of the felicity offered by philosophy and tries to
solve it in a careful manner in his Metaphysicales quaestiones. He says that the felicity
proposed by metaphysics is entirely different from that offered by theology. The theo-
logical felicity is supreme and cannot be treated by the metaphysician: “Felicitas est
duplex, est enim quaedam felicitas, quae summe et simpliciter est felicitas, sicut illa,
quam boni expectant in futuro post praesentem vitam, et de ista non intendimus ad
praesens nec de ista loquitur Philosophus. Alia est felicitas, quae summe et simpliciter
non est felicitas, et est illa, quae ex puris naturalibus acquiri potest, et ista est possiblis
in praesenti vita et de hoc loquitur Philosophus et nos loqui intendimus” (see I, Qu. 1
Utrum metaphysica sit finis vel beatitudo hominis, f. 1ra).
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Boethius of Dacia’s in his De summo bono sive de vita philosophi. Because
Boethius’s text has already received a great deal of attention, I shall present
a brief review of some motifs discernible in two other texts illustrative of the
widespread Boethian conception of philosophy, Albericus of Reims’s Phi-
losophia and John of Dacia’s De divisione scientiae. These two texts belong to
the series of general introductions to philosophy that came into existence
in the milieu of the faculty of arts at the University of Paris.49
At the beginning of his Philosophia Albericus gives remarkable testi-
mony of the reverence towards philosophy common in this milieu. He
begins by calling philosophy the most splendid gift of God’s generosity;
continues by asserting that, according to Averroes, it is a realization of the
perfection proper to human nature; and concludes by saying that it is the
best way to the supreme good, namely, God Himself.50
The same Boethian lofty evaluation of philosophy is part of the defini-
tions of philosophy, mostly of ancient provenance, collected by John of
Dacia. The most striking of these states that thanks to philosophy, human
beings can become perfect, good, and even a god, according to the propo-
sition from De consolatione that many are able to be gods by participation.
Therefore, thanks to philosophy, human beings can not only realize their
natural end, but also achieve something supranatural, namely, the diviniza-
tion of the human essence.51
In harmony with this high estimation of the role and function of
philosophy, since it is the highest principle for human life, is the extension
of philosophy’s domain. According to Albericus the term “philosophy” is
coextensive with sapientia and scientia. John of Dacia adds to this list ars,
disciplina, doctrina, methodus, and facultas. In this way, philosophy is taken to
be the sum of knowledge, as having everything as its object. Both authors
maintain that these terms differ only conceptually.52
49. A more exhaustive list of texts of this kind has been offered by P. Gauthier
in his “Notes sur Siger de Brabant. II. Siger en 1271–1275. Aubry de Reims et la
scission des Normands,” Revue des Sciences théologiques et philosophiques 68 (1984): pp.
3–28. See also p. 6. His presentation is not limited only to pure enumeration, but
he also shows the mutual affiliations and similarities between these texts, which
enables one to treat them as belonging to the same genre and manifesting more or
less the same tradition.
50. Aubricus Remensis, Philosophia, published as an appendix to Gauthier’s
article (n. 49 above) in Revue des Sciences théologiques et philosophiques 68 (1984): pp.
29–49. See v. 5–44.
51. Johannes de Dacia, Divisio scientiae (in Johannes de Dacia, Opera, ed. A.
Otto [Hauniae, 1955], p. 7, 1–3, Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, t.
I): “Per philosophicam autem disciplinam perficitur homo et fit (bonus, immo
deus, secundum quod dicit Boethius: natura deus est unus, participatione autem
bonitatis plures.”
52. See Aubricus Remensis, Philosophia, v. 265–79 and Johannes de Dacia,
Divisio scientiae, p. 5, 12–26. The identification of the designates of the terms
“philosophy,” “science,” “art,” “discipline,” and “doctrine” produces a kind of para-
dox. On the one hand, John of Dacia and Albericus of Reims emphasize one aspect
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Giles of Rome is conscious of the fact that the implications of this vision
of philosophy are incompatible with the Christian worldview. Therefore,
the emphasis he puts on the theoretical character of philosophy can be
viewed as a guard against its practical pretensions. Indeed, Giles is aware of
the practical function of metaphysics. To practice metaphysics means to
contemplate, and this is the highest activity possible for human beings in
this terrestrial existence. Philosophy’s main purpose, however, is not this
activity but pure cognition. Moreover, the practice of philosophy is placed
under that of theology. In practical terms, theology has dominion over
philosophy for two reasons. First, unlike metaphysics, it is a practical rather
than a theoretical science. Second, the end that theology considers and to
which it leads is supreme, namely, eternal glory.
In sum, the central thesis of Giles’s De partibus philosophiae essentiali-
bus—that only the speculative sciences consitute the essential parts of phi-
losophy—contrasts philosophy with the mechanical sciences, on the one
hand, and with theology, on the other. The whole structure of the human
science consists in  these three realms.  Although they aim at  different
ends—philosophy at the aquisition of purely theoretical cognition, theol-
ogy at salvation, and mechanics  at the  transformation of  the external
world—they are related to each other. We may sketch their mutual relations
in a triangle:
The triangle’s vertices show the groups of sciences, while its sides
depict their relations. Each vertex is opposed to the others and is allied
separately with any one of them against the third one. For instance, philoso-
phy as theoretical is opposed to theology and mechanics as practical. But
philosophy is also united with mechanics, because both are effects of the
activity of natural reason, in contrast to theology, which derives from divine
inspiration. Philosophy, however, like theology, has as its object immaterial
things, while, of course, mechanics deals with the material world.
of the Aristotelian theory of philosophy and, on the other hand, they present a
system of sciences that is more similar—because of their acceptance of the division
of arts into liberal and mechanical—to those of the twelfth century, which are less
Aristotelian than Kilwardby’s and Giles’s.
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APPENDIX
Domini Aegidii de Roma archiepiscopi Bituricensis De
partibus philosophiae essentialibus ac aliarum scientiarum
differentia et distinctione tractatus1
Duae sunt causae entium: intellectus et natura etc., ut vult Philoso-
phus II Physicorum.2 Ex his autem duabus causis per se, videlicet ex
natura et intellectu, sumunt originem duae causae per accidens,
casus scilicet et fortuna. Nam ex intellectu sumit originem fortuna,
quia, ut in eodem II habetur, “fortuna est in agentibus a proposito
propter aliquid.”3 Ex natura vero sumit originem casus, quia circa
causas naturales contingit esse casus, sed non fortuna.
Cum igitur in omnibus considerandum sit, quod est per se, et
dimittendum, quod est per accidens, ut vult Philosophus V Ethi-
corum,4 si distinctionem scientiarum sumere volemus, non accipie-
mus eam ex fortuna et casu, quae sunt causae per accidens, sed ex
natura et intellectu, quae sunt causae per se. Intellectus autem in
causando distinguitur a natura. Et, ut dicimus, quod aliud est
causatum a natura, aliud ab intellectu, oportet accipere intellectum
non pro intellectu divino vel intellectu substantiarum separatarum,
sed pro intellectu humano.
Consentiunt enim philosophi, quod causatur a natura, causari
ab intellecto divino et ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum. Ai-
unt enim, quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. Unde Com-
mentator XII Metaphysicae ait, quod “natura non agit, nisi
rememorata ab intelligentia vel a superioribus causis,”5 quae sunt
intelligentiae. Sicut ergo pars, quia comprehenditur in toto, non
proprie distinguitur contra totum, sic actio naturae quia comprehen-
ditur in actione divina et substantiarum separatarum, natura, ut est
causa entium, non distinguitur contra intellectum divinum vel con-
tra substantias separatas, sicut nec organum et instrumentum, ut est
1. This text is based on the German incunabulum, Tres tractatus domini Aegidii
de Roma, Lipsiae circa 1490, containing De partibus philosophiae essentialibus, De
differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae and De gradibus formarum accidentalium. Some
necessary corrections are marked by [ . . . ].
2. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1–2, 192b8–19b15.
3. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a5–8.
4. Aristoteles, Ethica nicomachea, V, 8, 1135a16sequ.







activum et causativum, dividitur contra principale agens. Nam omnis
actio organi est actio principalis agentis. Natura autem est organum
intelligentiarum et Dei. Nam, ut ait Commentator XII Metaphysicae,
“quae hic inferius aguntur, habent proprias mensuras ab intelligen-
tiis et ab arte divina intellectuali,”6 sub qua fiunt artes plures. Sub
arte enim divina sunt omnes intellectus substantiarum separatarum
et omnes artes earum. Cum ergo ait Philosophus duas esse causas
entium naturam et intellectum, oportet ibi accipere intellectum pro
intellectu humano. Hoc enim modo accipiendo intellectum, natura
est alia causa ab intellectu et actio naturae non est actio intellectus
nostri, licet sit actio intellectus divini. Est enim natura medium inter
intellectum divinum et humanum. Nam res naturales sunt mediae
inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram. Causantur enim huius-
modi res a scientia Dei, sed sunt causae scientiae nostrae. ,fol. a2r.
Unde Commentator super capitulo Sententia patrum praecedens omnia
dans differentiam inter scientiam divinam et nostram ait, quod
“scientia Dei causat res, scientia nostra causatur a rebus.”7 Quod non
est intelligendum de rebus quibuslibet. Nam agibilia et artificialia
causantur a scientia nostra. Possumus autem dicere, quod sicut natu-
ralia sunt media inter intellectum divinum et nostrum, sic intellectus
noster est medius inter naturalia et artificialia. Nam sicut naturalia
causantur a scientia Dei et causant scientiam nostram, sic scientia,
quae est in intellectu nostro, causatur a naturalibus et causat artifi-
cialia.
Prima ergo divisione sic dividi possunt entia: quaedam sunt
causae scientiae nostrae, quaedam vero sunt causata a nobis et ab
intellectu nostro. Ea vero, quae ab intellectu nostro causantur, in
triplici genere esse videntur, quia quaedam sunt intentionalia, ut
intentiones, quae sumunt originem ex actionibus rationis; quaedam
vero dicuntur esse realia; et haec distinguuntur, quia quaedam sunt
factibilia, quaedam agibilia. Factibilia autem dicuntur, ex quibus
resultat aliquod factum vel aliquid in effectu, cuiusmodi sunt opera
artium mechanicarum, ut ex arte fabrili resultat cultellus, ex domifi-
cativa domus. Agibilia vero sunt opera deservientia nobis ad vitam
perfectam sive ad vitam virtuosam et felicem, ex quibus non resultat
aliquod factum, cuiusmodi sunt opera prudentiae et aliarum virtu-
tum. Unde Philosophus in Ethicis dans differentiam inter pruden-
tiam et artem ait, quod “prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ars vero
est recta ratio factibilium.”8 Bene ergo dictum est in triplici genere
esse ea, quae ab intellectu nostro causantur, quia quaedam sunt










6. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 18, (Apud lunctas, t. VIII, f. 305D).
7. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 51 (Apud lunctas, t. VIII, f. 337B).
8. Aristoteles, Ethica nicomachea, VI, 5, 1140b2–31.
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large, prout ipsae intentiones sunt quaedam entia, dicere possumus
entia esse in quadruplici gradu, quia quaedam sunt realia causantia
scientiam nostram, quaedam intentionalia, quaedam agibilia,
quaedam factibilia.
Dimissa ergo grammatica, quae in multis ad placitum esse
videtur, dici potest, quod secundum haec quattuor genera entium
sunt quattuor genera scientiarum. Nam scientiarum sive artium
quaedam sunt speculativae reales, quaedam rationales, quaedam
morales, quaedam mechanicae. De entibus igitur realibus causan-
tibus scientiam nostram sunt scientiae speculativae. De intentionali-
bus vero sunt scientiae rationales. De agibilibus vero sunt morales.
De factibilibus sunt artes mechanicae.
Harum autem artium solae speculativae essentiales partes phi-
losophiae esse dicuntur. Nam philosophia est propter inquisitionem
veritatis. Veritas autem maxime consurgit ex his, quae sunt per se et
principale obiectum intellectus. Ad hoc igitur, quod aliqua ars sit
principalis pars et essentialis philosophiae, duo requiruntur. Primo,
quod in ea finaliter intendatur veritas. Secundo, quod sit de eis, quae
sunt per se et principale obiectum intellectus. Artes ergo morales et
mechanicae essentialis pars philosophiae esse non possunt. Nam
cum huiusmodi ,fol. a2v. artes sint practicae, in eis non princi-
paliter intenditur veritas, sed opus; quia, ut scribitur II Metaphysicae,
“finis speculativae est veritas, practicae vero opus.”9 In moralibus
enim intenditur pricipaliter non veritas, sed opus agibile, in
mechanicis vero opus factibile, propter quod talia essentialiter ad
philosophiam pertinere non possunt. Artes autem rationales etiam
essentialis pars philosophiae esse non possunt. Nam etsi in eis prin-
cipaliter intenditur veritas, quia dialectica, quae rationalis est, ut a
multis  conceditur,  indagativa est veritatis,  non  tamen  tales  artes
essentialiter ad philosophiam pertinent, quia non sunt de his, quae
sunt principale obiectum intellectus. Intentiones enim, de quibus
sunt artes rationales, non sunt principale obiectum intellectus, sed
res.
Solae igitur scientiae speculativae, quae sunt de rebus, cuius-
modi sunt physica, mathematica et divina, essentialiter ad philoso-
phiam pertinent. Bene igitur dictum est, quod scribitur VI
Metaphysicae, quod “triplex est modus essentialis philosophiae:
physicus, mathematicus et divinus.”10 Ex hoc ergo patere potest,
quomodo distingui habent scientiae speculativae. Nam si huiusmodi
scientiae sunt de his, quae sunt per se et principale obiectum intel-
lectus, et cum per se et principale obiectum intellectus sit quid
abstractum, secundum diversum modum abstractionis oportet ac-
9. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, II, 1, 993b20–21.










cipere diversitatem talium scientiarum. Omnis enim scientia specu-
lativa abstrahit, sed non omnis aequaliter abstrahit, immo est ibi
triplex gradus abstractionis, secundum quem triplicem gradum ac-
cipiuntur praedicta tria genera scientiarum. Priumus enim gradus
abstractionis est, ut fiat abstractio ab hac materia sensibili et ab illa,
sed non a materia sensibili simpliciter, et est modus abstractionis
physicus. Hoc ergo modo accipitur scientia naturalis. Secundus gra-
dus abstractionis est, ut fiat abstractio a materia sensibili simpliciter,
sed non a materia intelligibili, et sic accipitur scientia mathematica.
Tertio modo potest sumi abstractio ab omni materia sensibili et
intelligibili, et hic est modus metaphysicus et divinus. Metaphysica
enim est de ipsis intelligentiis, de quibus dicitur VIII Metaphysicae,
quod sunt entes praeter omnem “materiam sensibilem et intelligi-
bilem.”11 Omnis ergo scientia speculativa vel est de abstractis secun-
dum esse et definitionem, et sic est metaphysica, vel de abstractis
secundum definitionem, sed non secundum esse, et sic est mathe-
matica, vel nec de abstractis secundum definitionem nec secundum
esse, et sic est naturalis sive physica. Naturalis autem scientia et
metaphysica non distinguuntur in plures scientias, sed mathematica
plures scientias sub se habet. Nam quaedam mathematica est de
quantitate secundum se et absolute, quaedam vero de quantitate
contracta et relata ad aliud. De quantitate autem secundum se est
duplex scientia, secundum quod duplex est genus quantitatis. Nam
de quantitate continua est geometria, de discreta est arithmetica. De
quantitate autem ,fol. a3r. contracta et relata ad aliud sunt plures,
secundum quod pluribus modis talis relatio et talis contractio esse
habet, ut de quantitate discreta relata ad sonum est musica, de
quantitate vero relata ad distantias stellarum et ad motus super-
caelestium orbium est astronomia. Propter quod geometria et arith-
metica sunt scientiae principales et simpliciter. Astronomia vero et
musica sunt scientiae ex suppositione et subalternatione. Sicut ergo
secundum subalternationem, secundum quod quantitas continua
vel discreta refertur ad aliud, accepta est astronomia et musica, sic
accipi possunt plures aliae scientiae: ut ex relatione ad visum accipi-
tur perspectiva, quae est de linea relata ad visum sive de linea visuali,
ex relatione vero ad aedificia accipitur steriometria, quae est de
mensura aedificiorum. Patet ergo, quomodo accipi habet distinctio
speculativarum scientiarum tam principalium quam sublaternarum.
Distinctio autem mechanicarum sumitur ex distinctione et se-
cundum diversitatem factibilium, quae ex talibus artibus resultant.
Nam, ut dicebatur, ars mechanica est recta ratio factibilium. Oportet









11. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VIII, 6, 1045a36.
12. [tales] correxi, in incunabulo “talia.”
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Talium igitur artium alia erit fabrilis, alia dolativa, alia carpentaria,
alia lanificativa, alia textoria, et sic de aliis, prout secundum eas
diversa factibilia esse habent. Est enim inter has artes differentia,
quia quaedam magis negotiatur circa materiam, quaedam autem
magis circa formam, quaedam sunt magis dominativae et architec-
tonicae, quaedam vero sunt magis servientes et ancillae, ut navefac-
tiva est architectonica respectu dolativae et textoria respectu
lanificativae. Secundum ergo differentiam factibilium et secundum
differentiam principalitatis et [ancillativitatis]13 distinctio mechani-
carum artium sumi habet.
Morales autem scientiae, quae maxime sunt, ut boni fiamus
(nam  in talibus scire modicum utile est, operari vero multum),
distingui habent secundum diversas communicationes et secundum
differentiam bonitatum in communicationibus repertarum. Omnis
enim communitas bonum aliquod coniecturat, ut dicitur I Politi-
corum.14 Secundum igitur triplicem communicationem sumitur tri-
plex scientia moralis. Videmus enim unam communicationem et
unum regnum, prout diversae potentiae animae ordinantur ad intel-
lectum, ut irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae sunt rationales per par-
ticipationem, ordinantur ad idem, quod est rationale per essentiam.
Et talis communicatio sive tale regnum est in una persona singulari.
Secunda communitas est, prout diversae personae ordinantur ad
unum patremfamilias, ut uxor, filius, servus etc. ordinantur ad unum
gubernatorem familiae. Et tale regimen est in una domo. Tertia
communicatio est, prout ordinantur ad unum principem et ad
unum ducem. Et talis communicatio sive tale regnum est in civitate
vel regno. Secundum ergo has tres communicationes, in quibus alia
et alia ratio est bonitatis, accipitur ethica, oeconomica et ,fol. a3v.
politica, ut de regimine sui, prout per intellectum quis alias potentias
animae regit, tractat ethica; de regimine vero familiae, prout pater-
familias gubernare habet uxorem, filios et servos, tractat oe-
conomica; de regimine vero civitatis et regni tractat politica.
Viso ergo, quomodo distinguuntur scientiae speculativae, artes
mechanicae et morales, restat videre, quomodo distinguuntur sicen-
tiae rationales. Huiusmodi autem scientiae, accipiendo large actus
rationis, rationales sunt, quia sunt de actibus rationis. Dico autem
accipiendo large, quia, ut In Elenchis15 diffusius diximus, scientiae
rationales non proprie sunt de actibus rationis, sed sunt de inten-
tionibus formatis per huiusmodi actus. Inductio enim, exemplum et
enthymema et syllogismus, de quibus sunt scientiae rationales, non
13. [ancillativitatis] correxi, in incunabulo “acillativae.”
14. Aristoteles, Politica, I, 1, 1252a1–5.
15. Aegidius Romanus, In Aristotelis De sophisticis elenchis commentum, ed.










proprie dicuntur actus rationis, sed magis dicimus esse intentiones
formatas per huiusmodi actus rationis. Syllogismus enim et inductio
non dicunt ipsum intelligere, sed dicunt aliquid formatum per intel-
lectum. Accipiuntur ergo scientiae rationales, secundum quod tales
intentiones diversificari habent. Sicut enim, quia bonum gentis est
divinius quam bonum unius, scientia, quae determinat de bono
gentis, ut politica, est alia a scientia, quae determinat de bono unius,
ut ab ethica, sic, quia syllogismus efficacius arguit quam enthymema
et inductio quam exemplum, dialectica, quae principaliter est de
syllogismo et inductione, est alia a rhetorica, quae est de enthyme-
mate et exemplo. Duae ergo sunt artes rationales: rhetorica et dia-
lectica, quae differunt eo, quod una efficacius arguit quam alia.
Unde in I Rhetoricorum dicitur, quod “rhetorica est assecutiva dialec-
ticae”,16 ambae enim sunt de quibusdam communibus, ambae sunt
de quibusdam intentionibus et de quibusdam actibus rationis, quae
nullius scientiae  est considerare.  Patet ergo, quomodo rhetorica
differt a dialectica, nam rhetorica est assecutiva dialecticae et infe-
rior ea et deficit ab ea et principaliter est de enthymemate et exem-
plo, quae deficiunt ab inductione et syllogismo.
Praetermissa ergo divisione rhetoricae, quia de ea non est
speculatio praesens, divisionem dialecticae videamus. Dictum est
autem dialecticam non esse de actibus rationis, sed de intentionibus
formatis per huiusmodi actus. Prout ergo intellectus aliud et aliud
format, accipienda est alia et alia pars dialecticae. Tria enim facit
intellectus intelligendo. Nam intellectus primo intelligit simplicia et
deinde intelligit composita. Vel intelligit ea simplici intuitu et in se
ut principia, vel intelligit ea cum discursu et in ordine ad aliud ut
conclusiones. Cum ergo intelligit simplicia, format definitionem,
per quam definitionem formatam in mente significat res vel defini-
tum sive nomen, iuxta illud IV Metaphysicae:17 ratio, quam significat
nomen, est definitio. Prout vero intellectus intelligit composita sim-
plici intuitu, ,fol. a4r. format enuntiationem. Sed prout intelligit
cum discursu, format rationem et syllogismum. Tota ergo dialectica
vel est de termino incomplexo ut liber Praedicamentorum, vel de
enuntiatione ut Perihermeneia, vel de syllogismo ut libri artis novae.
Liber autem Porphyrii et Sex principiorum, quae Aristoteles non
edidit, non sunt essentiales partes logicae, sed sunt quaedam admini-
culantia ad ipsam. Sicut enim intellectus tria format, videlicet defini-
tionem, enuntiationem et syllogismum, sic oportet esse tres
essentiales partes logicae: unam, quae determinat de termino in-










16. Aristoteles, Rhetorica, I, 1, 1354a1, translatio Guillelmi Moerbeke.
17. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 7, 1012a23–24.
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quae  determinat  de enuntiatione, et aliam, quae determinat de
syllogismo, cuiusmodi (ut dicebatur) est tota [ars.]18 nova.
Potest ergo accipi distinctio librorum artis novae, prout diversi-
mode determinari  habet de  syllogismo: vel enim  determinat  de
syllogismo universaliter secundum se, sic est liber Priorum, vel ut
habet esse contractum. Hoc erit dupliciter, quia haec contractio vel
est per necessitatem materiae, vel per habitudinem localem. Si per
necessitatem materiae, sic est liber Posteriorum, ubi tractatur de syllo-
gismo demonstrativo, qui [est]19 ex veris et necessariis et causis
conclusionis. Si vero fit talis contractio per habitudinem localem, vel
illae habitudines sunt congruae et probabiles, vel nec sunt congruae,
nec probabiles, sed videntur esse congruae et probabiles. Primo
modo est liber Topicorum, ubi determinatur de syllogismo sive
elencho secundum se, qui fulciri habet per habitudines locales con-
gruas et probabiles. Secundo modo est liber Elenchorum, ubi deter-
minatur de syllogismo sophistico et elencho non secundum se, sed
ut obliquari habet per argumentationes sophisticas, quae argumen-
tationes sophisticae fulciri habent per habitudines locales, quae nec
sunt probabiles nec congruae, sed videntur esse congruae [et]20
probabiles.
Et haec sufficiant.
18. [ars] correxi, in incunabulo “pars.”
19. [est] addidi.
20. [et] addidi.
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